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Abstract: The recently commenced negotiations on a trans-
atlantic free trade area (TAFTA | TTIP) are likely to have an 
impact on transatlantic and global agricultural and envi-
ronmental regulation. The potential for developing a global 
trade regime that is able to face the pressing global food and 
environmental challenges of today and tomorrow, such as 
food security and climate change, depends to a large degree 
on whether the two major global players are able to arrive at 
concerted efforts to address them. This article will show how 
EU and US values and policy paradigms related to food and 
agriculture have developed over the last decade and are likely 
to affect the prospects for a TAFTA | TTIP. The more conver-
gent the developments on either side of the Atlantic, the better 
the chances of (1) arriving at a TAFTA | TTIP, without agricul-
tural issues such as genetically modiﬁed organisms (GMO) 
and non-tariff barriers impeding the endeavour, and (2) the 
trade agreement being conducive to tackling global food and 
environmental challenges. This way the article investigates 
whether a TAFTA | TTIP is likely to enhance the prospects 
that the world can be fed in the future and a sustainable 
planet is possible.
INTRODUCTION: SETTING THE SCENE
Negotiations on a transatlantic free trade agreement 
commenced in July 2013. These are expected to be com-
prehensive, covering virtually all aspects of EU-US trade. 
Economists are now commenting on the great beneﬁts this 
will entail for industries on both sides of the Atlantic. At the 
same time, it is an issue of debate whether the TAFTA | TTIP 
is an alternative for multilateral negotiations or rather com-
plements them. The optimistic view is that the negotiations 
will result in global standards for trade and investments and 
solve a range of issues that are currently stalling the mul-
tilateral negotiations within the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). TAFTA | TTIP would then provide a basis for future 
multilateral cooperation. This view will only hold though, if 
the negotiators succeed in tackling sensitive issues, such as 
agriculture. Furthermore, these solutions subsequently have 
to be acceptable to their trading partners in the WTO if they 
are to affect the prospects for future multilateral solutions.
This article will focus on agriculture. First of all because 
experience to date indicates that the interconnected ﬁelds 
of agriculture and trade have been the subject of intense 
transatlantic conﬂict-potential. Secondly, because it is partic-
ularly through concerted agricultural trade policy that major 
societal challenges at a global level, such as food security and 
environmental sustainability, can be effectively addressed. 
The idea of a transatlantic free trade agreement is not new. 
It was also considered in the 1990s. However, sharp differ-
ences in EU and US agricultural support measures and major 
transatlantic disputes over export subsidies, beef hormones 
and GMO seeds and foods, proved to be insurmountable 
obstacles at the time (Schott & Oegg 2001, 745). Currently, 
agricultural issues are again expected to complicate the 
negotiations (Grueff 2013; Trachtenberg 2012). A question 
of major importance, therefore, is whether the contentious 
agricultural issues of the 1990s are still likely to pose similar 
problems now. Much will depend on the degree to which EU 
and US agricultural paradigms and policies have converged 
over the last two decades. Both actors reformed their agricul-
tural policies repeatedly since the 1990s. If these measures 
have resulted in substantial convergence, then the odds of 
arriving at a successful TAFTA | TTIP agreement increase, as 
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well as the prospects that the EU and the US could set power-
ful precedents that can be followed at the multilateral level.
In the remainder of this paper I will ﬁrst compare and contrast 
agricultural policy paradigms and reforms on both sides of 
the Atlantic. I will subsequently elaborate on a number of 
major outstanding issues, such as hormone beef and GMOs. 
The ﬁnal section will reﬂect on the consequences of these 
developments on both sides of the Atlantic for the prospects 
of and potential effects of a successful TAFTA | TTIP. 
TWO DECADES OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORM IN 
THE EU AND THE US
In the area of agriculture, three important paradigms need to 
be distinguished. These paradigms are frameworks of cogni-
tive ideas about how the world is put together and normative 
ideas of what implications these should have for public policy. 
The dependent agricultural paradigm advocates state inter-
vention and special treatment of the agricultural sector, while 
the rivaling competitive paradigm promotes subjecting agri-
cultural trade to market-forces. Finally, the multifunctional 
paradigm emphasizes the multiple environmental and social 
functions of farming for which farmers should be rewarded 
(Garzon 2006; Daugbjerg & Swinbank 2009). The three dif-
ferent paradigms implicate different farm policies, which are 
illustrated by the development of agricultural policy on both 
sides of the Atlantic.
After World War II, the dominant view was that agricultural 
production needed to be stimulated to ensure food secu-
rity. In line with the dependent paradigm, it was argued 
that the farm sector deserved governmental intervention 
and support, because it had to cope with unpredictable 
natural conditions and inelastic prices. Over the years, the 
US started to move toward a more competitive paradigm 
(Skogstad 1998). It allowed market-forces to operate to a 
larger degree in the sector and replaced the trade-distorting 
price support with direct income support. By completely 
decoupling such income support from production in the 
1996 Farm Bill, farmers’ production decisions became less 
dependent on governmental policy and instigated by mar-
ket prices instead. The policies were partly reversed in the 
2002 Farm Bill. This bill did not only maintain the (originally 
transitory) direct income payments at a constant level, but 
also extended them to more crops. Furthermore, the ad hoc 
emergency payments granted to farmers in 1998 were now 


























ter-cyclical payments: payments that automatically increase 
when market prices drop. The trend to lower farm subsidies 
was thus curtailed. Robert L. Thompson (2005) argues that 
this represents a complete ideological turnaround away from 
market-orientation, increasing the trade distorting impact 
of US agricultural policies. Naturally, this weakened the US 
negotiating position in the WTO Doha Development Round. 
Currently, the US Senate and House of Representatives are 
trying to reach agreement on a new Farm Bill. While the exact 
outcome is not yet clear, budget pressures ensure substan-
tial cuts and are likely to result in a scaling down of support 
measures.
The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) moved in the 
direction of the multifunctional paradigm in the 1990s, rather 
than the competitive paradigm (Skogstad 1998; Garzon 2006). 
Two decades after the US transition to income payments, 
the EU followed suit in the 1992 MacSharry reforms. It was 
particularly the Uruguay Round negotiations of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that instigated this 
shift from price to income support. In this GATT agreement, 
price support and export subsidies were labelled ‘trade 
distorting’ and had to be reduced. Income payments, how-
ever, were not subject to reductions, because they were not 
assumed to have a substantial negative impact on trade. By 
shifting to direct income payments, the EU could thus make 
its agricultural policy GATT-proof. The EU’s legitimization of 
the direct payments reﬂects a multifunctional paradigm. The 
agricultural sector does not only provide food production, it 
was argued, but also performed multiple environmental and 
social functions (supporting rural culture, animal welfare, etc.). 
These services were not reﬂected in market prices and should 
therefore be rewarded through public policy. Subsequent CAP 
reforms further decreased export subsidies and price support, 
while decoupling the direct income payments from produc-
tion. Market-forces thus also became increasingly important 
in EU agriculture. Considering the Commission’s focus during 
the latest CAP post-2013 reform debate on the public goods 
that European agriculture provides and for which it should be 
rewarded, the multifunctionality paradigm is still very much 
alive in the EU though.
The increasing global importance of the issue of sustainability 
resulted in the introduction of the ﬁrst agri-environmental 
measures in the 1980s and 1990s on both sides of the Atlan-
tic. But US and EU policies differ in two important respects. 
First, US policies are aimed at reducing negative externalities 
of agriculture, such as soil erosion and water pollution by 
compensating farmers for taking land out of production. The 
EU, alternatively, focuses on expanding positive externalities 
of farming (the multiple environmental functions and ser-
vices mentioned earlier) and argues that this is best achieved 
by expanding agricultural activity. Secondly, US policies are 
more targeted than EU policies. Speciﬁc programs in the US 
focus on soil erosion and water pollution and compensation 
is related to output. To receive agricultural payments in the 
EU, it is sufﬁcient to apply certain agricultural inputs or farm-
ing practices that are considered environmentally friendly 
(Baylis et al. 2008). The Commission’s ‘greening’ proposals in 
the Post-2013 CAP reform sought to introduce a more trans-
parent link between direct income payments and the delivery 
of environmental public goods, making 30% of the payments 
dependent on implementing certain environmental meas-
ures. Their likely environmental effectiveness is questionable 
though (Matthews 2013). These measures, just like the multi-
functionality argument used by the EU to include non-trade 
concerns such as environmental standards in the WTO Doha 
Development Round, are therefore often regarded as smoke-
screens for policies that are primarily aimed at transferring 
money to farmers, while distorting international trade (Baylis, 
Rauser & Simon 2005).
While EU and US agricultural policies thus clearly converged 
over the last two decades, reducing governmental inter-
vention and allowing market-forces to operate, important 
differences remain, both in terms of their policy paradigms 
and their policies. A number of speciﬁc issues are further 
likely to complicate the TAFTA | TTIP negotiations, to which 
I will now turn.
OUTSTANDING ISSUES
Two of the issues that stiﬂed negotiations on a free trade area 
in the 1990s are still problematic: hormone beef and GMOs. 
These biotech and sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) issues 
in WTO-speak are considered to be a potential deal-breaker 
(Trachtenberg 2012). Several WTO panels have decided in 
favour of the US in the hormone beef case. The EU rather 
accepts the US WTO-approved retaliatory measures, though, 
than lifting its import ban. The existing WTO’s SPS agree-
ment allows measures taken to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health on the basis of science-based evidence. 
The US claims there is no scientiﬁc evidence that hormone 
beef or GMOs endanger human or plant life or health. The 
EU, however applies the precautionary principle, arguing that 
when the possibility of harmful effects exist but scientiﬁc 
uncertainty remains, states are allowed to take action, such 
as implementing an import ban. They furthermore refer to 
“other legitimate factors” for such policies, including con-
sumer concerns (Grueff 2013). 
Clearly, different cultures with respect to food safety exist on 
both sides of the Atlantic. In the US, scientiﬁc and technical 
innovations are welcomed. GMOs are considered a solution 
to deal with the global challenge of food security (pro-
ducing sufﬁcient food to meet increasing global demand), 
because GMO seeds and crops enable increased produc-
tion output on the same amount of land. In the EU a widely 
shared aversion exists against genetically engineered food 
and consumers prefer product labeling to know where their 
food has been produced and in what way (ibid.). While EU 
producers do not seem to be most critical of GMOs, envi-
ronmental and consumer lobbies exert great pressure to 
bar GMO products from EU land and markets. These fac-
tors will make it difﬁcult for the European Commission to 
make substantial concessions on this issue. Its discourse in 
public documents reﬂects this tough stance: “Our high level 
of protection here in Europe is non-negotiable” and “Tough 
EU laws, like those relating to hormones, or those which are 
there to protect human life and health, animal health and 
welfare, or environmental and consumer interest will not 
be part of the negotiations” (European Commission 2013). 
This will undoubtedly result in a clash in the negotiations, 
as the United States Trade Representative, Ron Kirk, already 
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indicated that an ambitious SPS chapter will be a major US 
demand (Corporate Europe Observatory 2013).
A new issue of discontent concerns the so-called Geo-
graphical Indications (GI). GIs represent a kind of intellectual 
property right based on the product’s originating in a certain 
region within a particular country. Well-known examples 
are Parma ham and Roquefort cheese. The EU claims that 
the quality and reputation of these products are inextrica-
bly linked to the regions they originate from and cannot be 
transferred elsewhere. The EU demands protection of these 
GIs to prevent their usage by other producers. GIs proved 
to be an important contentious and unresolved issue in 
the Doha Round. However, in recently concluded free trade 
agreements with countries such as Korea and Singapore, the 
EU succeeded in ensuring a certain level of protection for 
GIs. Negotiations with the US, who are more critical of GIs, 
is likely to prove more difﬁcult. But acceptance of GIs as an 
intellectual property right while excluding products that can 
actually be seen as generic could prove to be a way forward 
(Trachtenberg 2012).
THE PROSPECTS FOR AND EFFECTS OF A SUCCESSFUL 
TAFTA | TTIP
Compared to the 1990s, current conditions are more con-
ducive to the successful conclusion of a TAFTA | TTIP in 
several respects. First of all, the multilateral Doha Develop-
ment Round is totally blocked, which increases the sense 
of urgency for at least reaching a transatlantic agreement. 
Secondly, with respect to agriculture, US and EU policies 
have converged in the sense that they have both become 
increasingly market-oriented. Thirdly, EU usage of agricul-
tural export subsidies, a major bone of contention in the 
1990s, decreased so signiﬁcantly that they will no longer 
complicate the negotiations.
As elaborated above, SPS issues are likely to become the 
major potential deal-breakers. Keeping the issue out of the 
TAFTA | TTIP seems highly unlikely, considering the US drive 
to have this issue resolved. Since both the EU and the US 
defend very strong positions on the matter, only concessions 
from both sides are likely to enable agreement. A potential 
solution suggested by Trachtenberg (2012) is that the EU 
accepts the science-based method, while the US allows 
product-labeling.
Agri-environmental measures could also cause complications 
given the very different regulatory regimes on both sides of 
the Atlantic. To the extent that the measures are decoupled 
from production - which is increasingly the case - the EU and 
the US are likely to reach agreement relatively easily, as these 
measures would also be considered ‘green box’ measures in 
the WTO. It is unlikely though that the US will accept all EU 
measures to promote environmental public goods, as these 
are at least in part perceived as concealed protectionism. 
Since both parties will particularly aim at defending exist-
ing policies in the TAFTA | TTIP, an eventual agreement is 
also unlikely to raise transatlantic environmental standards. 
However, as these standards are relatively high in global com-
parison, they could be a powerful precedent for the rest of 
the world.
This, however, raises the question of whether an agricultural 
agreement in the TAFTA | TTIP is likely to provide a solution 
for the debate on agriculture in the WTO. On the one hand, 
since the EU and the US are both considered relatively protec-
tionist in the area of agriculture, the outcome of the TAFTA | 
TTIPP in this domain is unlikely to satisfy their WTO partners. 
Furthermore, the successful inclusion of its potential agri-
environmental measures in the Doha Development Round 
would depend on their acceptance among developing states 
in particular, as these states opposed the inclusion of such 
non-trade concerns. On the other hand, considering that the 
other WTO trading partners can only beneﬁt from the trade 
concessions in the transatlantic agreement if they to some 
extent accept it as a template for a multilateral agreement, 
they may be compelled to make concessions on agriculture. 
The odds of a TAFTA | TTIP enabling agreement in the Doha 
Development Round on agriculture thus remains uncertain, 
but whatever the outcome, it is unlikely to signiﬁcantly con-
tribute to global challenges of environmental sustainability.
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